American Government Strategy And Generic Tamiflu
In April of 2009, three identifiable swine flu cases in Texas prompted the Governor to request nearly 38,000 doses of oseltamivir from the CDC.
In November 2005, Then president George W. Bush asked Congress for funds totaling 7.1 billion USD for emergency financial support for a flu pandemic awareness and preparation plan [this on top of a bill passed by the senate for 8.1 billion USD]. Included in the Bush program was a desire to purchase 1.4 billion dollars worth of government purchased antiviral medications.
What Happens When Oseltamivir Is Stockpiled?
With oseltamivir in short supply, many people began to stockpile the medication in the event of an outbreak. A number of American states issued declarations, which in no uncertain terms discouraged people from doing this. Of late, the manufacture of tamiflu seems to have finally leveled off according to demand. This means many of the issues accompanying stockpiling have been diverted somewhat. The problem has only been weigh laid and if a pandemic once again looms, lowered supply will again become a problem.
It has been argued in medical journals that when personal stores of these medications are used the risk of resistant strains of the virus could become reality if lower dosages are utilized. Current guidelines provide only ten – 75 mg capsules as a recommended dosage and this may prove to be inadequate in a breakout.
Another reason not to store drugs is the tactical administration of the medications to first responders or critical care personnel should come first. Hardest hit population centers also require crisis management of meds because of vulnerability leading to easier spread of the virus and those folks who actually are hit with a flu virus. There have been arguments about the moral reasoning behind wealthier populations or countries receiving preferential access to drugs. When stockpiling occurs, the drugs may be diverted from poorer destinations in order to compensate and the poor countries are likely harder hit by infection. In that same vein, it is difficult to condemn personal stockpiling when corporate warehousing of these drugs is so prevalent and even encouraged.
A further dispute says that home use of tamiflu would make it trickier to establish whether or not a prescription is imitation or not. There is real uncertainty with this issue but in the event of an outbreak, people may go ahead with their purchase regardless. In late 2005, some fifty three parcels of fake tamiflu pills were seized by US Customs agents in San Francisco. These packs displayed Generic Tamiflu on the wrapper. Roche personnel can speak of only a single instance of bogus tamiflu surfacing outside the U.S – there were inaccurately labeled pills discovered in Holland that were only vitamin C and lactose. The concern is that high brow unlawful distributors could easily make genuine looking wrapping down the road.
A final issue regarding warehousing of drugs is that Viruses are only diagnosed in a minimal number of laboratories globally; hence, how are those with personal stockpiles going to determine if symptoms being felt are those of an influenza strain or some other less threatening condition. The problem with this argument is that treatments should already be started by the time a diagnosis is made from any lab.
A dispute favoring personal warehousing stems from manufacturer Roche saying for the record that if more shipments weren’t soon received they could be forced to in fact, restrict their production of tamiflu. Personal stockpiling would bring the market to bear at this point, continuing manufacturing levels that would allow for entire on hand supply to climb in case orders once again surpass manufacturing potential, something such as an influenza pandemic or outbreak.